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studied. Households have finite life spans. Futures markets are incomplete. Agents 
have full information in one case, and receive only a limited signal in another. In 
both instances the existence of a time-autonomous transition rule is proved such 
that if all agents forecast using it, the economy’s actual growth will bear the 
predictions out. The rule corresponds to a steady state for a non-stochastic model. 
With limited information. it is seen to depend on all past signals. Several approx- 
imation theorems which may facilitate future applications are presented. Journal of 
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There are a variety of possible approaches for studying the equilibria over 
time of economies which are subject to random disturbances. One method 
presupposes that a permanent central authority (or single infinitely lived 
household) manages key variables to maximize an economywide welfare 
function-see Brock and Mirman [4] and Merton [ 141. (Recent applications 
and elaborations include, for example, Danthine and Donaldson [5] and 
Kydland and Prescott [ 121.) A potential second alternative is the 
Arrow-Debreu model [ 1,6], which is not centrally directed. Bewley’s [3] 
extension of it to an infinite number of goods allows the possibility of 
studying economic growth over a limitless time horizon by labelling 
commodities according to their periods. 
A third approach also assumes a decentralized economy, but in contrast 
to Arrow and Debreu restricts contracting to a limited set of markets 
operating at discrete intervals. Analyses in this class are sometimes called 
“temporary equilibrium models”-see, for instance, [ 11, 1, 10, 171. Often 
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agents in such models can trade current goods freely but have only a few 
financial instruments available for their savings-perhaps because in practice 
the costs of setting up and operating markets serve to reduce their numbers. ’ 
Because of the restricted and sequential nature of opportunities for tran- 
sactions, agents generally need to predict the future behavior of others. 
This paper studies a model from the third group. We use a variant of the 
life-cycle savings paradigm familiar from [ 18, 7, 191, modified to incorporate 
stochastic shocks. The economy is decentralized and it lasts forever- 
although individual households do not. We assume that all agents at each 
time possess the same information and that their expectations about the 
future are rational in the sense defmed by Muth [ 161. We consider two 
versions of the framework, one with complete information, and one in which 
agents are incompletely informed. 
Our principal contribution is to establish the existence of time-autonomous 
probability transition rules determining growth paths which are sequences of 
temporary equilibria consistent with rational expectations. Because of their 
time independence, the transition functions are natural stochastic analogues 
of deterministic steady states. They belong to the category of solutions which 
Hicks [ 111 calls “equilibria over time” and which Radner [ 171 labels 
“equilibria of plans, prices, and price expectations” (as well as “the perfect 
foresight approach”). The connection between utility and production 
functions, on the one hand, and our equilibrium transition rules, on the other, 
is explicit. 
In the full information version of the model, our equilibrium generates a 
Markov process for vectors of state variables. The process has a finite 
number of stationary probability distributions, and the economy must begin 
to obey one within a finite number of time periods. We present a 
mathematical result on the feasibility of obtaining practical approximations 
of our equilibrium transition rule. 
The analysis with limited information has somewhat different charac- 
teristics. Perhaps because of the costs and other difficulties of acquiring 
personal asset and income data on households, in this case at each date our 
agents receive signals which only partially reveal the current state of the 
economy. In such a world, we show that market participants will generally 
find old signals useful for reducing their uncertainty about the present. In 
fact, our equilibrium transition rule depends on information from the infinite 
past. A crucial question is whether signals from the very distant past have an 
asymptotically small importance, and we outline a test for that property. 
Again, we also discuss approximations. 
’ Also, at any given time, not all of the parties with whom a current agent will expect 
someday to conduct trades will yet have been born. 
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We make very few assumptions about preferences and production. In 
order to establish the existence of our two equilibrium transition rules, 
however, we do require that all commodity magnitudes and price levels come 
from discrete sets. Although this at first may seem mathematically less 
elegant than employing continuous variables, it enables us to obtain results 
which otherwise apparently (see Sect. 2) would be out of reach or would 
require very detailed economic behavioral restrictions. It also provides a 
framework which appears to be very flexible with regard to admitting 
elaborations beyond the scope of this paper. Arguably costs of measurement 
precision, record storage, and computation do lead to discreteness in all 
actual economies. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 1 presents our basic 
model. Section 2 proves the existence of a stationary equilibrium transition 
rule in the case of full information. Section 3 considers approximations. 
Section 4 studies the case of limited information. 
1. DISCRETE VARIABLES 
This section presents our full information model. 
Our household sector consists of overlapping generations of families. Each 
family lives N periods. We let 2 < N < co. If N > 3, at each time there will 
be age-related differences among households young enough to save; conse- 
quently, with virtually no sacrifice of generality, we can disregard other 
sources of intragenerational heterogeneity and let there be one family of each 
age alive in each period. There are no inheritances or bequests. There is no 
government sector. Physical capital is the sole outlet for saving. As in Brock 
and Mirman [4], there is an aggregate production function subject to random 
shocks. Although the overall framework is reminiscent of a stochastic 
version of Diamond [7], Section 2 shows that the fact that we allow family 
life spans longer than two periods is extremely important (in our context). 
As stated in the introduction, we assume all price and quantity variables 
belong to discrete sets. Section 2 attempts to illuminate the need for this. We 
assume each discrete set contains all non-negative integral multiples of a 
minimal unit. Prices, for example, may all be whole numbers of pennies. Let 
1 be the non-negative integers. 
The detailed elements of our model are as follows. 
Production 
If Qt is aggregative output at time t, Kl the aggregative (physical) capital 
stock, L the potential labor supply, and & a realization from the random 
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shock variable 1, the economy has an aggregate production function j(e) 
with 
Qt = J-Wu L 4). (11 
Capital depreciates in one period, and Kt must have been built (and 
linanced) at time t - 1. We normalize the price of output to 1 and assume it 
is homogeneously divisible into investment and consumption goods. If Zj E Z 
is the (exogenously given) labor supply of the household of age j (for any 
time t), 
For the sake of simplicity, we let ,$, A,+, ,... be independent samplings 
from x-which has a known distribution. We want f(a) to obey an Inada 
condition creating an upper bound (see Lemma 1) for the sustainable 
magnitude of Kt, and we let f(e) be monotone in K and L. Formally, 
(Al) We assume 
(i) For all t, ,?l E A with A a finite set. p(A) gives the probability of 
each realization of 1. 
(ii) f: Z x Z x A + Z is nondecreasing in its lirst two arguments. 
(iii) There exists Z? E Z with k > 1 such that ,? E A, K E Z, and 
K > i? imply f (K, L, A) < K. 
The Labor A4arket 
Aside from price and quantity discreteness, we want the labor market to 
operate along neoclassical lines. Let Wl be the time t wage rate. 
The correspondence giving the aggregate demand for labor at time t is 
Because Wt must be an integer, we can not expect in general that labor 
supply and demand wiI1 equal one another exactly. Instead, we assume W, 
always takes the highest value consistent with zero or positive excess labor 
demand. Imagine, for example, that competition for employment immediately 
eliminates any wage leaving an excess labor s~pply.~ 
* As our proofs show, many other assumptions, here and in the case of profit distributiow 
are possible. 
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We want a lower bound, x’, for the capital stock such that a market wage 
exists for all K > Z? and, to make a positive labor supply credible, such that 
sup .Y(K, 1,1) > L all K > Z? and A E A. Section 2 establishes the existence 
of equilibria with K, > k all t. 
Define 
Then 
W-(K,, A,> = { W, E 1 I SUP p(K,, I+‘,, A,> > 15). (4) 
(A2) We assume there exists i E I such that k < k and 1 E TF(K, A) 
all ;1 ~/i and K E I with K > k. If ZV”(K,, 1,) # 0, total employment is L 
and the market wage is IV, = W(K,, A,) = sup V(K,, A,). 
Assets and Profits 
As in the case of labor, we want returns for savers to correspond closely 
to neoclassical pricing. 
Let aj, be the assets the family of age j at time t carries from t to t + 1, let 
a, = (a,,,..., a,,), and let 1 be a row vector of ones. Then K,, 1 = za,. The 
absence of bequests implies uNI = 0 at t. We assume bankruptcy laws prevent 
families from ever having negative net worth: 
(A3) We assume a, E IN all t. 
We must face the following minor complication. If total profits are z,, 
7~~ = x(K,, 2,) = j-(K,, L, 4) - WK,, 4) . L. (5) 
Suppose rc, = $1.01 and K, = 3. Then an equal, integral distribution of profits 
is impossible. The next assumption requires that in such a situation two units 
of capital receive S.34 and one receives $33, and that all three outcomes 
satisfying these conditions are equally likely. 
If we define 
r(K,, 1,) = max(r* E Z 1 r*K, < 7t(K,, A,)}, (6) 
r(K,, A,) corresponds to S.33 in our arithmetic example. Then 
(A4) Given K, > I? and 1, E A, we assume that all profit distributions 
exhausting n(K,, A,) and paying each asset unit either r(K,, A,) or 1 + 
r(K,, A,) are possible and equally likely. No other distributions occur. 
Suppose a,-, E IN, K, = ra I-1 > I?, and jl, E /1. Name the (finite) set of 
acceptable time t profit distributions R*(K,, A,). Let the (equal) ex ante 
chance of each one be p*(K,, A,). Then if yjr is the total time t income of 
famiiy j-including Zj . W(KI, A,) as well as profits-and if y, E (yi(,..., yNl), 
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we can define a function @p(e) such that conditional on any oF E 
Q*(q-, 3 &), 
Y, = @(a 1-1,&,qq. (7) 
Household Preferences 
In order to employ dynamic programming below, we assume that 
household utility functions are additively separable. 
(A5) We assume 
(i) if a given household’s age i consumption is ci > 0, its current 
flow of utility is a finite real number u(ci, i). 
(ii) At age j the household above chooses its saving and 
consumption to maximize, subject to our non-negativity constraint for asset 
holdings, the expected value of Cyzj u(ci, i). 
Household Forecasts 
We assume (until Section 4) that households know at each time t the 
current distribution of income, yI. This vector should register all data that 
agents need for predicting a, ; a,, in turn, implies (via za, = K,, i) an ex ante 
distribution for next-period factor prices and for y,+, , on which forecasts 
farther into the future depend. Let 9’(1”‘) be the power set of I”‘. Then for 
every A, E .Y(ly), we use a probability transition rule 
(8) 
to describe each family’s anticipations about a, conditional on y,. Because of 
our discrete variables, even if utility functions are strictly concave, 
households will sometimes find themselves indifferent between several 
savings levels. Other than that, a, would always follow deterministically from 
y, ; because of it, sensible expectation functions g(.) may well assign positive 
probabilities to more than one a, for some vectors .Y,. 
Notice that assumption (Al) implies the economy cannot maintain a 
capital stock exceeding R: 
LEMMA 1. Suppose assumption (Al) holds. Let a, E IN be the economy’s 
actital vector of assets of the close of period t. Then if la, > I?, there exists 
t’ > t such that la,,, < if, all t” > t’. If la, <x, la,, < I? all t* > t. 
The Appendix presents a proof. 
In light of Lemma 1, we confine our attention to states of the economy 
with zalp, , <Z?. In fact, to insure that W, is well defined, we concentrate 
(with the help of assumption (A7)) on values of a,_, in the finite set 
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on values of y, in (the finite set) 
w,* Efl*(la,&,,J-,),y=.v,= @(a,-,,&,w::)), 
and on expectation rules in 
(10) 
3 E (g: .V(,d) x $2 + [0, 1 ] ( for each 2’ E ,JY, 
g(. , y) is a probability measure on. W’ }. (11) 
Note that the conditions g E 55 must obey for all (A, v) E .Y(-&) X y are 
0 < g(A Y) < 1, d-d, .v> = 1, and g@, .v> = CnEA g(b), Y>. We often write 
s(a, y) in place of g({a}. Y). 
Suppose household j observes y, E ?$Y and forecasts future factor returns 
using g(. , y,) some g E .%‘. Let xjl be its actual saving at time t. Our 
definition of “equilibrium” below forces xit and predictions of aj, via g(. , y,) 
to correspond in a precise manner. For the time being, however, we allow the 
two to be completely distinct so that, as in conventional competitive models, 
household j can believe that its choice of xjl has no noticeable effect on 
overall prices. 
Consider the returns household j projects (at time t) for units of xjr. 
Conditional on any a, E ,JZ’, K,,, = UZ,, 11+ I E A, and w,*, , E 
f2*(K ,+, , At+ ,), if xjt = ail, the household should anticipate a time (t + 1) 
income equal to component j + 1 of @(at, I,,, , cc,*,,). If xjl f uj,, we 
assume the household will anticipate a return on each extra unit of savings of 
1 + ‘(K,, 11 A,+ ,) with an ex ante probability p(K,+ , , A,+ ,+qualing the 
frequency of this return in the economy (given K,, 1 and A,+ ,), 
~Wt+,r4+,)- [~(K~+,,~t+~>-r(K,+,,~,+,).K,+,IIK,+, (12) 
and a return of r(K I+ r, A,+ ,) with probability 1 - p(K,+, , A,+ i). Again this 
seems consistent with the usual idea of price-taking behavior. 
Formally, 
WI we assume 
(i) all households forecast with the same expectation function 
gE.‘t. 
(ii) At time t, conditional on u, E &‘, K,,, = za,, A,+, EA, and 
or?+, E fl*(K,+,, A,+ 1), household j will anticipate a time (t + 1) income 
equal to component j + 1 of @(a,, I,, 1, w,*, ,) if its current savings, xjl, 
equal ajt. Let r = r(K,+ r, ;1,+ i) and p = p(K,+ r, II,, 1). It will anticipate a 
gain (loss) on each unit by which xjr > (<) ajt of 1 + r with probability p, 
and r with probability 1 -p-the outcomes for different units of xjl - ail 
being independent. 
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Using the notation of (A6), let the set of anticipated possible payoffs on 
xjl - ait at t + 1 be 
~**=a**(a,,~,+*,xj,lj), (13) 
label the probability (computed from (A6)) of each w;“+: E R* * with 
P**(“l,~,+,,Xjt,WI*+*l,J 9 ‘) and let the family’s total next-period income given 
Q-J:+~ EQ** be ~(a,,~,+,,Xjt,Wt*tI,W~+~,j). 
Household Behavior 
We now turn to the utility-maximization problem of households. 
If family j at time t uses g E F’ and y, E $? to forecast the future and has 
an actual present income y$, let v( y,:, yI, j; g) be its expected lifetime utility 
from time t onward. We define v: I X $Y x {l,..., N} X .F -+ (-co, co) recur- 
sively: for j = N, 
v(Y&, it, N; s> = MY,&, N); (14) 
for 1 <j,<N- 1, 
Lines (14), (15) determine each family’s saving at each age j. 
Let v(y$, y,, j; g) be the set of maximizing values of x in line (15). 
Because of our discrete units, such a set may contain more than one element. 
Since there are no bequests, w(y&, y,, N; g) = (O}. Define 
Y(y,; g)- l&l,,, Y,, 1; g) x ... x V(Yw YvN; 8). (16) 
Then for each g E .F and yI E $?‘, Y( y, ; g) gives all desired savings vectors 
(x ,t ,..., x,,) = xt. In each case, we can see that Y( y, ; g) # 0 and 
WY,; g) = IN. 
If y, E J”, we have 
(17) 
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Thus, for yr E J’ and g E 3’, 
Xf E WY, ; g> implies 1x, < I?. (18) 
The next assumption guarantees that IX, > # as well. 
(A7) If yr E ,$? and g E .%‘, we assume IX, > K all xI E V(y, ; g), 
The idea is as follows. Suppose g(. , y,) assigns substantial probability to 
next-period capital stocks implying high interest and low wage rates. Then 
all age groups will tend to want to save to take advantage of favorable 
returns and to protect themselves against low next-period wages. If g(., y,) 
heavily weights the opposite outcome, people on the verge of retirement will 
want to save a great deal to defend themselves in the event of low interest 
rates. At the cost of more notation, we could allow personal uncertainties 
about incapacitating illness and skill obsolescence. As in the case of 
imminent retirement, households vulnerable to these problems would tend to 
save heavily (whether directly or in the form of insurance premiums) in the 
face of projected low returns. Parenthetically, extreme capital depletion does 
not seem to be a significant issue in, for example, Tobin’s [ 191 detailed and 
empirically motivated model. Assumption (A7) rules it out here. 
For g E 3 define 
T(g) = (y: .U(.d) x y + [0, l] ] for all y, E g’, 
y(. , y,) is a probability measure on ,d with 
Y(@,I. Y,) = 0 each a, 65 Y(Y,; g)). (19) 
Then f(g) gives the set of possible actual transition rules for the economy if 
all agents maximize utility and use the expectation rule g E 3. Because 
assumptions (Al) and (A7) guarantee 
qy; g) c d 
T(g) includes all such rules and we have 
T(g) f 0 each gE .Y. (21) 
Comparing lines (11) and (19), 
f(g) c by each g E .V. (22) 
T(g) will be a set with more than one element if Y(y; g) is for any y E 9. 
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2. EQUILIBRIUM WITH FULL INFORMATION 
This section defines our concept of equilibrium with full information 
and establishes existence. We also show that each equilibrium induces a 
Markov process for a, on ~8’ and that the process has a finite number of 
ergodic sets and stationary distributions, and we try to explain the impor- 
tance of discrete variables in our analysis. 
Our definition of equilibrium is 
DEFINITION. g(.) is a “stationary equilibrium transition function” if g E 
B = {g E .F I g E T(g)}. 
The word “stationary” refers to the fact that each g E 5 is time autonomous. 
The word “equilibrium” refers to the facts (1) that throughout our analysis 
we insist that markets clear (in accordance with (A2) and (A4)) and (2) that 
expectations are rational for each g E B in the sense that if all agents 
forecast with g, actual growth-specified by r(g)---can bear out their 
anticipations (about possible future prices and corresponding probabilities). 
If at least one consumer is equally satisfied satisfied with several current 
consumption-saving strategies, g E T(g) implies g(e) is consistent with one of 
them or with some ex ante assignment of probabilities to a subset of them. 
Despite the discrete-variable domain of each g(a), fortunately the set of 
functions .V is convex. For g, g’ E s, define 
Ilkg’ll -max{lg(l4~ Y>-~WL ~4: 6.h YE-~ x .VI. (23) 
Then 
LEMMA 2. 55 is convex. In the topology induced by I( + I(, .% is compact. 
The Appendix provides a proof. 
Lemma 2 enables us to establish the existence of a stationary equilibrium 
transition function. 
PROPOSITION 1. If assumptions (A 1 )-(A7) hold, the set B is non-empty. 
The Appendix supplies a proof. The proof applies a fixed point theorem to 
r(e) defined on .V. 
Suppose g E B determines the economy’s evolution over time. Then for 
each a, E ~2, the probability of transiting to A,, , E CU(&) is T(A,+ 1, a, ; g) 
with 
T(A l+l>al; g)= s c dA t+,, @(%4,,~G+il)> 1 ,+,‘A w;+,ER*(la,,A\,+,) 
* P*@% J”,, 1) * P&+ 1). (24) 
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For g E 8, line (17) and assumption (A7) imply 
T(d, a; g) = 1 all a E .o/“. 
Thus, r(.) defines a Markov process on -d. 
An ergodic set for r(.; g) will be a minimal subset A c .d with 
T(A, a; g) = 1 all a EA. 
(25) 
No two ergodic sets can overlap. Once the economy enters an ergodic set, it 
remains in it with probability 1 for each subsequent period. We have 
PROPOSITION 2. Let assumptions (Al)-(A7) hold and let g E 8. Then 
T(. ; g> has a positive, finite number of ergodic sets in .&. Each ergodic set 
has a unique stationary measure, giving the long-term frequency distribution 
for all subsets of points within the set. With probability 1 the economy wit1 
enter some ergodic set within a finite number of time periods. 
Once we note the finite number of points in .d, Proposition 2 follows 
directly from Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 in Chapter V of Doob [8]. 
In closing this section, we can ask how essential discrete units are to our 
results-discreteness does after all complicate the presentation in Section 1. 
As an answer, consider the continuous-variable model in Laitner [ 131. It is 
analogous to ours, except that families are restricted to two-period lives. 
With continuous variables, to obtain compactness for ,% (with a metric 
corresponding to line (23)) we need equicontinuity: at each ((a), y) with 
(u, y) E B’ x $?, every function in .%’ must obey a maximal “steepness” 
condition (for changes in y). Once we limit 55 to an equicontinuous family, it 
is difficult to show r(.%‘) c X’. Laitner [ 131 proceeds with reliance on two- 
period life spans and special assumptions not needed in the present paper. 
With two-period lives, families only need to predict next period’s aggregate 
capital stock; with N > 2, they need to predict the whole next-period 
distribution of asset holdings-in order to be able to go on and forecast later 
factor prices. For r(.‘!?) c .% with two-period lives, we must show that if a 
change in y, leads to a moderate change in the predicted K, + 1, the actual 
value of ~a, will vary only moderately; with N > 2, a moderate change in the 
predicted a, may lead to a less moderate variation in the Klt2 = zal+, 
predicted from a, (via y,, ,), causing the actual a, to change appreciably. For 
these reasons, in the absence of very special restrictions, Proposition 1 seems 
out of reach with N > 2 and continuous variables. Constraining family lives 
to two periods, on the other hand, seems unsatisfactory. A further benefit of 
our approach is that the mathematics underlying this paper appear to allow 
many generalizations in addition to N > 2. 
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3. APPROXIMATIONS 
Section 2 proves the existence of a fixed point for a correspondence 
defined over a space of functions. We now briefly indicate how an approx- 
imate equilibrium might be constructed. 
Our economic model determines .% and Z(.). We want g E .F with 
g E T(g). Define 
A(g) = Wll g-g’ll: g’ E %)I (27) 
all g E F. One natural approach is to try to minimize A(.) over a restricted 
class in F. We have 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose g,E.Y all ~EI and A(g,)+O as m-+a. 
Then there exists g E B and a subsequence g, of g, such that I( g, - gll + 0 
asn+co. 
The Appendix supplies a proof. 
Suppose 5”” is a subset of m-parameter functions in .F’. Let g, minimize 
A(.) on F”. (Notice that computing g, is a standard minimization problem 
on Rm-although A(.) may well not be continuous.) Then if 
lim m-a, A(g,) = 0, the sequence g, has a limit point g E P. 
4. LIMITED INFORMATION 
As outlined in the introduction, the ideas of incomplete financial markets 
and of limited access to information for all agents have related appeal from a 
practical standpoint. We now add the latter assumption to our framework. 
Specifically, we let agents receive a signal s1 at each time t revealing 
current national accounts data on K,, W,, L, and Q,. All previous signals 
also are public information. On the other hand, unlike Sections 1 and 2, 
agents do not observe distributions of assets or incomes in the economy at 
any date.3 We again prove the existence of a rational expectations 
equilibrium. Its form, however, is quite different from Section 2. 
The Framework 
We need to change the arguments of our household expectation function 
g(e) and to incorporate a related function h(.). Although we also need some 
new notation, many of the economic ideas of Sections 1 and 2 carry over. 
Assumptions (Al)-(A6) remain in force. 
’ Agents know their own income and asset holdings. However, as in conventional 
competitive models, we assume that this information alone about distributions has no bearing 
on economywide signals. 
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The latter assumptions define a function F(.) giving S, for each 
(u,+,.I,)E.d x‘4: 
s, = F(a,- 11 A,). (28) 
Agents know the form of F(.). Let .? be the space of signals, 
Then .Y is a finite set. 
li = F(,d, A). (29) 
Consider the family of age j at time t. Conditional on sl+ I and its current 
savings choice aj,. it can use (A2t(A6) to analyze its time (t + 1) income 
possibilities. Index the household’s next-period income possibilities set with 
u(ai,. s,,,), label the ex ante probability of each a,+, E CZ(U,~,, s + ,) with 
da;,.%+,,%+, 1 ) and let the income figure corresponding to CL~, be 
?)iiI.,t1=ilt(~,j,,S,+,.n,+,)Ef. (30) 
Conditional on knowledge of s,, , and the whole vector a,, provided zul and 
the K, + , component of S, + 1 coincide, the same household could deduce a set 
&a,, s,, ,). a function ,D*(.) with 
?‘r+ I =P “(%s,+,J,+,EI” each P, , , Em,, s,, 1)’ (31) 
and a probability q*(u,,s,+,./3,+ ,) each /I,+, E/?(u,, s,, ,). If za, and the 
K t+, partofs,,, arenotequal,letP(u,,s,+,)= iP,+,I,q*(a,,s,+,,p,+,)= 1, 
and Y,+ l = ,~*(a,, s,, , ,/I,+ ,) = any element of ,y. This last case receives a 
zero probability weight in the analysis below (see lines (48) and (49)). 
As it determines its time t utility-maximizing level of saving, householdj 
will know yi, and s,, s,-, . s,_ I ,... . It will need to forecast signals (from 
which it can predict factor returns) for the remainder of its life. We suppose 
it does so with 
g(S,+,.s,,s,+,....)~Pris,+,ES,+,Is,,s,-,,...j all S,+ I E .?(.2 ). (32) 
Let 
0,E (s s 1’ ,-,,St-2Y.. 1. (33) 
Then the indirect utility function u(.) for household j comes (recursively) 
from 
U(Y,V(, a , N; g> = 4YNlr w (34) 
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and, for 1 < j<N- 1, 
+ -v dh+ll~ Of> * s,+f;,v, s dx~%+l~a,+l) a,+,Ea(x.S,+,) 
. 44x,St+l,a,+,), (s t+IruAtj+ 1; g)l (35) 
all t. Lines (34) and (35) determine the household’s set of maximizing values 
of x, say W(JJ~, , cl, j; g). If yjt is finite and non-negative, w(.) will be finite 
and non-empty. As in Section 1, w( y,, , uI, N; g) = {O). Define 
Kv,, 0,; g> = w(.v,,, ut, 1; g> x ..a x w(.v,w ot,N; g>- (36) 
To see why in general g(S,+,,...) must depend on the entire history of 
signals u,, suppose g = g(S,+ , , I s ). Then urr g(.), lines (34) and (35), and 
the fact that every family begins life with no assets imply a set, say A,*, of 
possible values for a,.“ Let ST+, = F(A,Y;,n). Careful agents will want g(.) 
to assign zero probability to signals outside s,+ 1 of S,*, I. Since ST+ 1 depends 
on s,, s,-, ,..., s(-,~+~ in this case (by construction), to insure consistency 
between S,!‘+, and g(S,+ ,, .) all S,,, E .?(.i ), we will need 
g = g(S I+, , s, ,..., slpn,+?). If g(.) has this latter form, on the other hand, SF+, 
depends on s,,..., s,- Z,,.+ 3 ; hence, g(.) should too. Continuing in this way. we 
can see that only g = g(S,+ , , a,) will avoid objections. 
The conclusion itself is an interesting fact. 
Result: Households General@ Will Want to Use All Previous Signals in 
Predicting the Future 
In economic terms, because households lack complete knowledge about 
the present, they will try to piece together missing information as well as 
they can from the past. Parenthetically, this process may provide one reason 
why, say, a linear regression of observed vectors s, on lagged data sI-, . 
S (-*,... often seems to yield non-zero coefficients. 
The check derived for g(-) above is not the most exact conceivable: as we 
derived A,*, we disregarded possible restrictions on the interim components 
of a,-, imposed by s,, on afp2 by s*-,, etc. To be sure all such information 
is exploited, we assume that implicity or explicitly each household carries a 
model h(e) in mind with 
h(A,,u,)~Prla,EA,Iu,} all A, = .9(xf) (37) 
4 In other words, we can examine every living family’s sequence of lifetime maximization 
problems from birth to the present. 
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every t. For “equilibrium” we demand that h(e) and g(.) make corresponding 
forecasts with one another and with our behavioral equations. 
To establish the continuity and compactness needed for our fixed point 
results below, we limit the domains of h(a) and g(a) as follows. Suppose our 
analysis begins at time t = 0. Let s$, ST,, s?,,... be the actual history of 
signals. Let a,* = (s,*, s!, , s!,,...) = (s,*, o!,) 3 (s,*, s!~, a?,) E .a. . For m, 
n E I, define 
.Y *(m, n) c ((s, ,..., si, a?,): si E .9’ all i= l,..., n). (38) 
(Note, for example, that 9”*(0,0) = {oz}.) At time 0, only signal sequences 
in lJ,,> I .Y “(0, n) need be considered for the future. In fact, if 
$4.‘” s 
co u F‘*(m, n), (39) 
m>O,n>O 
all (past and future) behavior depends solely on sequences in .P’z. Notice 
that .i’z is a countable set, a great simplification below-whereas 
.? X .i X ... is not.’ 
Our sets of forecasting rules g(s) and /z(e) are 
.c EE (g: .S(.?) x .;/ 2 -t[O,11Iforeacha~.‘r~.g(.,o) 
is a probability measure on. Y’(, p.)), (40) 
X= (h:.4(,w’)x ‘7:+ [0, l]IforeachuE.~~,,h(.,u) 
is a probability measure on “P(, d)}. (41) 
For g, g’ E Z , we use the matric 
For h, h’ E.;;T, 
If g, g’E.‘C and h, h’E.;%C, then IIg-g’II<l and llh-h’ll<l. These 
strange-looking functions II . I/ --t R are metrics for arguments u E .;i & (of 
g(a) or h(.)), but not in general for u E .V x .S‘ X ... . They make our 
compactness and continuity results possible. In economic terms, they have 
the reasonable characteristic of, roughly speaking, weighting the present 
heavily relative to the distant future and distant past. 
We can establish a new version of Lemma 2: 
5 Munkres [ 15. p. 49 1 shows ‘r’z, is countable. In contrast, i x .‘r x .. has the same 
cardinality as the set of real numbers in (0, 1). 
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LEMMA 3. .Y and 3 are convex. In the topology induced by Ij . 11 both 
are compact. 
The appendix supplies a proof. 
Our new version of assumption (A7) is 
(A7 *) If .vt E $? g E 5, and ur E .U.&, Y(y,, u, ; g) c .&‘. 
The intuition is as in Section 1. 
For g E .Ct, the new version of r( .) is 
r(g) E (y: .S(.&) X $Y X ,U’.$ + [0, 1 ] 1 for all 
(y,, a,) E y x -?‘J$, y(., pt , a,) is a probability 
measure on d, and 
y(b,}, Y,, 0J = 0 ifa, @ Kv,, 0,; g>l. (44) 
If y E r(g), for every history u, E .U-$, (in other words, for every conceivable 
history) and every current income vector y, E $2, y(., .vr, a,) assigns 
probability weights to utility-maximizing (see lines (34) and (35)) savings 
vectors a,. Lemma 1 and assumption (A7*) allows us to disregard asset 
vectors not in -4. 
We can easily develop a metric for r(.%) by substituting (a. y) E .w’ x y 
for a E .c/ in line (43). With the implied topology, 
LEMMA 4. For g E ,%‘, r(g) is non-empty, convex, and compact. r(.) is 
upper semicontinuous on .‘t. 
The Appendix presents a proof. 
For g E .%, each y E r(g) shows how our economic model takes .v,. a 
given history of signals, and a given selection of asset vectors in the case of 




1 I 1. I 
. Y@,,P*(%, 9 s,+P,>, (s,, ‘5,.-1)) 
! 
* (45) 
Notice that for any (a,+ i, a,) E -c3 X .Y 2,) each y* E r*(g) is a probability 
measure, y*(., a,+ L, u,), on .d. The preceding lemmas yield 
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LEMMA 5. For g E S’, r*(g) is non-empty, convex, and compact. r*(.) 
is upper semicontinuous on .%‘. 
The Appendix provides a proof. 
The mapping in terms of which we define our equilibrium, E, has two 
parts. For S, E .a(.?‘), uI-, E 7 2, and h E P, define 
d(S,,u,+,;h)= 2: h(kv I I- of- 0 . P(A). (46) 
I@-,..l,)C dxA:Fln,-,..i,lES,l 
Then for (g, h) E ‘6 X r, define 
E’(g, h) 5s g” with g”(.)=d(.;h). (47) 
If h( .) describes households’ forecasting rule for next-period asset vectors, 
rational expectations will require that Z’(g, h) and g coincide. This will be 
our equilibrium consistency condition for g and h. Notice that E’( g, h) is 
single valued. Lemma 1, line (29), and line (41) imply that Zr(.V x r) c .Q . 
Given hE X; s,+,E 3, and u,E.‘i$, if d(s,+,,u,;h)=O, s,,, is a 
probability 0 outcome (in terms of agents’ predictions). If d(s,+ , , u,: h) + 0, 
we can define agents’ forecast of a, conditional on s,, , and u,: 
h(a,. s,+, ,a,: h) 
lx h(ia,L 0,). P@,+ ,)ld(s,+ I9 u,: h) 
1-L ,+,E.Z:f.~la,..3,.,)=s,,,I 
alla,E.rj,s,+,E,i,u,E.~ *,andhE X. (48) 
Coupling this with f*(.), we have a way in which agents can, with the 
exacting thoroughness outlined at the beginning of this section, check h(.): 
they will want to verify that h E Z*(g, h) where for (g, h) E .C x X, 
for somey*ET*(g) and allA,+,E.P(.6) 
and (s,+,~ u,)E,i,~,h”(A,+,,(s,+,.u,)) 
5.5 &“, Y”(A,+ I* a,, (s,, , ,u,)> .4a,, s,,, - 0,; A) 
I 
if d(s,+ , , u, ; h) f 0; if d(s,+ , , a,; h) = 0, 
A*(.? (s,+,t a,)) is an arbitrary probability measure on .rj . (49) 
t 
When d(.) # 0, h(.) defines a conditional probability measure on .FJ. 
Thus, Lemma 1 and assumption (A7 *) show S2(g,h)c r all 
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(g, h) E .Y X .?‘. Outcomes (sI+ i, a,) E ,Vz with d(s,+ 1, a,; h) = 0 are unin- 
teresting from an economic standpoint, being probability 0 events (in terms 
of the forecasted evolution of the economy, and in equilibrium the actual 
evolution as well). Nevertheless, from a mathematical perspective we need to 
define E”‘(s) even for d(e) = 0 and to do so in way leaving ,?‘(.) upper 
semicontinuous. 
Equilibrium 
We are now ready to establish the existence of an equilibrium. 
We have a definition corresponding to Section 2. 
DEFINITION. (g(a), h(.)) constitutes a “stationary equilibrium transition 
rule” for our new model if (g,h)E~‘-{(g,h)E.~~~~I(g,h)E 
e(g, h) = ((%s h), z*(g, h))}. 
As before, in equilibrium markets always clear (in the sense of (A2) and 
(A4)) and agents’ expectations are rational. Neither g(.) nor h(.) has a time 
argument; however, we should note that the domain of g(.) is .P(.Y’) X ,9’&, 
the domain of h(d) is .P(-&) X P’$, and 9’& depends on a$, an actual 
history of signals through time 0. Thus, the nature of the set for o, over 
which g(.) and h(.) are themselves detined is different for different values of 
t. 
Our basic result is 
PROPOSITION 4. Let assumptions (Al)-(A6) and (A7*) hold. Then the 
set of stationary equilibrium transition rules, 8, is non-empty. 
The Appendix supplies a proof which is based on a fixed point analysis for 
E(. ) on .% X .P. 
From a practical viewpoint we would like to be able to approximate some 
(g, h) E B with functions, say G(v) and H(A), having finite numbers of 
arguments. Furthermore, we would like to be able to use (G, H) to make 
forecasts at any date. Although our analysis so far neither establishes nor 
denies the possibility of such approximations, it does suggest an approach 
for checking on their existence in particular cases. 
The approach is as follows. In order to study approximations which 
remain valid for all t, we construct a metric *I( . I(* independent of our prox- 
imity to time 0: for g, g’ E .V and h, h’ E 2, define 
*(I g - g’ (I* = sup max I ds, 0) - g’h 011 (50) 
nl,tlEI SE ?,oe V+(m,n) 
*Ilh - h’ll* = ;w, act F;.,~ n) Ih({aI, 01 -h’({aI, ~11. (51) 
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To be able to truncate to a finite list of arguments while introducing only a 
known maximal error, for any 0 E (0, 1) define subsets 
.2*(o)= {gE.%‘/for all nEIand s, ,..., s,,~.>., 
sup Ig(s 1 ‘*A-, s,. 0) - g(s, ,..., s, , 0’ >I < 8” 1, 
O.O’E i ;, 
(52) 
<p*(Q) = jh f&X 1 for all n E I and s, ,..., s,, E .‘4’ and a E ,ti., 
““P * 1 h(a, s, ,.-.) s,, a) - h(a, s, . . . . . s,,, a’)1 < B” ]. (53) 
c.u E ’ (,, 
Then we are interested in elements of .% *(@) x .Y*(6) close, as measured 
with *II . II*, to some (g, h) E 8. Notice that although .% x .Irv is not 
compact with *I) . II*, 
LEMMA 6. For any 19 E (0, l), 3 *(Q) and P*(e) are compact in the 
topology induced by *I) . I/*. 
The Appendix supplies a proof. (Note also that .Y‘” x .Y 2 = ..9 z, all n E I.) 
Fix any f? E (0, 1). Suppose ‘t’” c .% *(B) and .p” E p”(0) are families 
of m-parameter functions. For all (g, h) E .Z x X, define 
Suppose for each m we can find (g,, h,) E .V m x ,X”’ with 
lim d*(g,,h,)=O. 
m-m 
Then there is a subsequence (g,, h,) of (g,, h,) and an element (g, h) E P 
such that if “Cm” means “limn-W”, 
lim *II g, - gll* = 0 = lim* Ijh, - hII*. (56) 
PROPOSITION 5. Let assumptions (Al)-(A6) and (A7*) hold. Fix any 
8 E (0, 1). Let .S’” x GY c .V*(8) x R*(B) all m E I. Let line (55) hold for 
some (g,, h,) E .v” XX” all m E I. Then there exists (g, h) E B and a 
subsequence (g,, h,) of (g,, h,) for which line (56) holds. 
The appendix provides a proof. 
Thus, for some 19 E (0, 1) we try to find .%‘” x .R” c .V*(B) x Z*(e) and 
(g,, h,) E .%” X ?‘” such that line (55) holds. Suppose we have been able 
to do so. Fix any E > 0. Proposition 5 shows there is a subsequence (g,, h,), 
an element (g, h) E 8, and an n* < 00 such that IZ > n* implies 
*)I g - gnlj * < e/2 and *iI h - h,)) * < e/2. We can choose n* * < co with 
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FZ** > n* and F’ < s/2. Truncate the list of past-signal arguments for both 
g ,,*. and h,,,. to n**. Call the new functions G and H. Then we can use 
(G, H) to approximate the equilibrium (g, h) E P knowing that for any time 
t and any history ‘J, E .Y’&, time t one-period forecasts from (G, H) and 
(g, h) will not differ by more than E. 
Although we could try to relate the ergodic sets of (G, H) to those for 
(g, h), that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents an overlapping generations model subject to random 
shocks. We assume financial markets are incomplete. Agents may know the 
entire current distributions of income and wealth, or their information may 
be limited. In each case we prove the existence of a time-independent 
probabilistic forecasting rule which, if employed by all agents, leads to an 
actual stochastic growth path bearing out the predictions. We find that in the 
case of limited information, current forecasts will generally depend on all 
previous observable signals. 
Although we use relatively few behavioral restrictions, we do require that 
quantity units and prices come from discrete sets. This complicates our 
notation somewhat, but in the end we find it greatly facilitates our 
mathematical arguments. In particular, it enables to establish compactness in 
various contexts-even (see Sect. 4) for a set of functions with infinitely 
many variables. 
In addition to basic existence results, we present several theorems 
developing approximations. The latter may eventually lead to econometric 
estimates and/or to policy simulations. 
APPENDIX 
1. Proof of Lemma 1 
Let za, > I?. Define f*(K) = Max,.,, f(K, L, A). za,, , < zy(+, <f *(la,). 
Thus, given (Al), a plot off *(.) and 45.degree line, with k on the abscissa. 
will show there exists t’ > t such that za,., <I? all t” > t’. Let za, < i?. Then 
given (Al), za !+, < zy,, 1 ,< f *(#?) < I?. Continuing in this way, la,+> < I?, 
etc. 1 
2. Proof of Lemma 2 
Step 1. We show 3 is convex. 
Let g’, g” E .%‘; BE (0, 1); y E $V’; and A E 3(&). Define 
g(.) 3 8. g’(.) + (1 -0). g”(.). Then 0 < 0. g’(A, y) + (1 -0) . 
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g~f(A,y)=g(A,y)~8+1-8=1;g(~oP,y)=8+1-~=1;and,summing 
over all aEA, g(A,y)=BCg’(a,y)t(l-e)Cg”(a,y)=C [O*g’tU,Y)t 
(1 - 6) * gN(a, v)] = c g(a, y). so, g E <%. 
Step 2. We show .Z‘ is compact. 
.rJ X JP is finite. So, .v+ X q = (2, ,..., zn] some n < co. Suppose 
g, E ‘6 all m E I. g,(z,) E 10, I] all m. So, we can find a subsequence g,, ,) 
of g, converging at zl. Similarly, a subsequence g,,*, of g,,1) converges at 
z2. Continue in this way. Then g,,,,) converges everywhere on .I<’ X $‘. 
Rename it g,i. 
Let “lim” stand for “lim,i+r”. Define g(z,) = lim gj(zi) all i = I,..., n. 
n ( co and the construction of gj imply lim ]] g - gj]] = 0. Let y E ,p and 
A E P(. rJ ). Summing over a E A, define g(A, .v) = C g(a, Jf). Then g(A, y) = 
c g(u, 1’) = c 1’ im g/(a, y) = lim 1 gj(a, JJ) = lim g,(A. J) E [0, 1) and 
g(,cti’, JJ) = lim gj(.cJ, 4’) = lim 1 = 1. So, g E ‘g. Sequential compactness 
implies compactness in a metric space (see [ 15, p. IS], for example). 1 
3. Proof of Proposition 1. 
We want to apply the Tychonoff-Kakutani-Ky Fan fixed point 
theorem-see Berge [ 2, p. 25 1 ]-to r defined on .C . We have already 
established .6’ convex and compact, T(.Q ) c 7, and r(g) # 0 all g E .? . Let 
g E .‘C .
Step 1. We show T(g) is convex and compact. 
Let y’, y” E f(g); 8 E (0, 1); and YE q. Define ,T(.) = 0. y’(.) t 
(1 - 0) . y”(.). Let a E .Q but a & Y(y; g). Then y(a, JJ) = B . ~‘(a, 4’) + 
(1 - 8) . ~“(a, JJ) = 0 + 0 = 0. Combining this with the analysis in Step 1 of 
the proof of Lemma 2, we find y E r(g), Hence, r(g) is convex. 
Lety,E~(g)allmEZandlim,~,~~y,-y~~=OsomeyE.Z.Let~E~. 
Let a E .v’ but a @J Y(y; g). Then y(u, JJ) = lim,+,, ~~(a, ?I) = lim,,, 0 = 0. 
So, 7 E r(g). Thus, r(g) is closed. r(g) c Z and 7 compact. So, r(g) is 
compact. 
Step 2. We show f(.) is upper semicontinuous on .Z. To do so. we show 
that if U is open in .6 with r(g) c U, there exists s(g) > 0 such that g’ E .T 
and ]I g - g’(] < c(g) imply f( g’) c U. 
Let r(g) c U with U open. If y1 = y and JJ,+ = ~1~~ = yj, for each x call the 
(. } expression on the right-hand side of line (15) 6(y, x, j; g). Define 
Y*(J), j; g)= (x E I] x< yj and x & w()jj, y, j: g)). y is finite. Fix any 
y = (y, ,..., -J,~) E ~7. Then we can write u’*( ~1, j; g) = (zl ,..., z,,,} some 
m < co-with m = 0 if Y*(y,j; g) # 0. Let x* E I,@~, ~,j; g). Then 
~(JJ, zi, j; g) < 6(y, x*, j; g) all i = l,..., m. Thus, line (15) and part (i) 
of assumption (A5) show there exists E*(Y, x*, j; g) > 0 such that g’ E .Z 
and /] g - g’l] < c*(y, x*. j: g) imply 6(y, zi,f; g’) < 6(y, x*, j; g’) all 
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i= l,..., m. Let c(g) = min{.s*(y, x*, j; g) 1 x* E v(yj, y, j; g), y E J?, and 
1 < j ,< NJ. Because $Y and v(yj, y, j; g) are finite, a(g) > 0. 
Let y E y’, g’ E .%, and ]] g - g’]] < s(g). Then a & !P(y; g) implies 
a 6S Y(y; g’). So, Y(y; g’) c Y(y; g). Hence, Z( g’) c Z(g) c U. 1 
4. Proof of Proposition 3. 
Let A( g,) + 0 as m + 0. Since .‘t’ is compact, there exists a subsequence 
g, of g, and g E .V such that ]] g, - g]] + 0 as n -+ 03. Suppose g G Z(g). 
Since we have shown Z(g) is compact, there exists E > 0 with d(g) = E. Let 
u- ug*dw BE,3(g*).6 Since Z(a) is upper semicontinuous, there exists 
6 > 0 with 6 < s/3, and with g’ E .Y and /] g - g’]/ < 6 implying Z(g’) c u. 
Then g’ E .%‘ and (] g - g’]] < 6 imply A( g’) > c/3. This contradicts 
d(g,)+Oand(]g,-g](+Oasn-tco.So,gEZ(g). I 
5. Proof of Lemma 3 
We work with .%. ./i” is virtually the same. 
Step 1 (convexity). With g(.) defined over (S, u) E Y(,Y’) X .9 2 rather 
than (A, JJ) E *P(d) x y , repeat Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 2. 
Step 2 (compactness). The set {(m, n): n E I} is countable. Label its 
elements J(k), kE I. Let gi E 3 all iE I. g,(e) E [0, 11, and .Y‘*(m, n) is 
finite each (m, n). Thus, we can find a subsequence gi,,, of g, converging on 
1 Y x ;L’ *(J(O)). gjtO, has a subsequence g,(r) converging on .9‘ x Y *(J( 1 )), 
and so on. Let gj be the jth element of gicj,. Then gj converges everywhere on 
.Y x.9’& by construction. Let “lim” stand for “lim,i,,“. Define 
g(s, a) E lim gj(s, a) each u E U’& and s E ,P . 
Choose any E > 0. Select n* < co with (4)“’ < F. Let 
,Y’** = u,,,,,+ Uo.,n<n+ .Y *(m. n). Then .Y’** is finite. So, there exists -. x 
n* * < co with j > n ;* Implying max SE v,oe ye. I g(s, 0) - g,i(s, a>1 c E. Then 
j>n** implies I] g - gj]i < E. Hence the arbitrariness of E yields 
lim I] g - gjJ] = 0. 
For (S, a) E .3(. 7 ) X U.z,, define g(S, a) = CsEs g(s, a). Then summing 
over s E S, g(S, a) = C g(s, a) = C lim gj(s, a) = lim C gj(s, a) = 
lim gj(S, 0) E [0, 1] and g(.Y‘,a)=limgj(.?‘,u)=lim 1 = 1. So, gE.5. 
Thus, as in Lemma 2, .Z is compact. 1 
6. Proof of Lemma 4 
Step 1. Let gE.F. z-(g)+0 because KJ4 0; g) f 0 each 
(y. a) E jP x 92. Let y’, y”EZ(g); t9E (0, 1); and y(.)r0.y’(.)+ 
(1 - 0) . y”(.). Then a 6!G Y(y, a; g) implies ~(a, y, a) = 0 . 0 + (1 - 0) . 
0 = 0. So, convexity follows as in Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 3. Let 
6 B,,,(g*) stands for the open ball of radius 43 about g*. 
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yi E T(g) all in I and limidoo 11 yi - yII= 0. Then a 66 !Y(y(y, a; g) yields 
Y(a,Y, U)= limi,m Yi(GY, 0) = limi,cc 0 = 0. Compactness then follows as in 
Step 2 in the proof of Lemma 3. 
Step 2. Let g E ,Y., r(g) c U = open. We want to show there is c > 0 
such that g’ E .V’ and 11 g - g’ II < [ imply r( g’) c U. 
For y E r(g), define B,(y) E {probability measures y*: ,Y(<&) x jY X 
.~~-[o,1lI&>ll~-~*Il~. s ince r(g) is compact, there exists F > 0 such 
that B,(y) c U all y E r(g)---see 19, p. 1581. 
Find n* < 03 with (4)“’ < E. Let ,? ** E IJosmGn~,osnsn. ,ic’*(m, n). 
Then .Y’** IS finite. So, as in Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 1, there 
exists [ > 0 such that g’ E .%‘ and I/ g - g’ 11 < [ imply Y(y, a; g’) c 
y(v, a; g) all (y, a) E j? X ‘2 * *. Thus, y’ E r( g’), g’ (5 .%, and 
II g - g’ll < i imply Y’@, Y, 0) = Y”(4 Y, 0) some Y” E r( g> all 
(a,y,u)E~dXyx.~’ . * * But then 1) y’ - y” (( < E by the construction of 
.‘/ **. SO, y’ E B,(y”) c U. Then the arbitrariness of y’ E I( g’) implies 
T(g’) c u. 
So, g E .V and 11 g - g’ II < [ imply r( g’) c U. I 
I. Proof of Lemma 5 
Step 1 (convexity and compactness). Let g E .Y’. T*(g) # 0 because 
T(g) # 0. Let y*, y** E T*(g); BE (0, 1); and v(.) E 0. y*(.) + (1 - 19). 
y**(.). Then summing over a finite set of /rs, y*(.) = C q*(.)y’(.) and 
y**(-) = C q*(a) . y”(.) some y’, y” E r(g). So, y(e) = 8 . 2 q*(.) . y’(.) + 
(1 - e> . c q*(s) . y”(.) = cq*(*) * [O. y’(a) + (1 -e) * y”(a)/ E r*(g) 
because T(g) is convex. 
Let y,*(.) = C q*(.) . y,,(.) E r*(g) all n E f-where y, E I(g). Let “lim” 
be “lim,,+m”. Taking subsequences if necessary, the compactness of T(g) 
implies there exists y E T(g) with lim /I y, - yII = 0. Define y*(a) = 
Cq*(.) . y(q). Then y* E r*(g) and lim IIy* - y,*II = lim IIC q*(.) . y(.) - 
C q*(e) . r,(.)ll = 0 b ecause lim /I y - y,Il = 0. So, r*(-) is compact. 
Step 2 (upper semicontinuity). Let gE.Y and T*(g)c U=open. As in 
Lemma 4, there exists E > 0 such that y* ET*(g) implies B,(y*) c 17. If y, 
r’EV) and Ily-~‘11 cc, then IICq*(.).Y(.)-Cq*(.).Y’(.)II<&. 
Lemma 4 shows there exists 6 > 0 such that g’ E .Y and (I g - g’[I < 6 imply 
T(6) = Uydyg) B,(Y)* 
Let g’ E .V and 11 g- g’I/ < 6. For y’ E T(g’), let y*(.) z C q*(.) . y’(.) E 
r*( g’). r( g’) c UyETcgj B,(y) implies there exists y” E r(g) with 
((7’ - ~“(1 <s. Let y**(-)- Cq*(.) + y”(+)ET*(g). Then ((y** --*I( <E. 
SO, y* E B,(y**) c U. The arbitrariness of y* E r*(g’) then shows that 
g’E.Y’and /Ig-g’(I <6imply~*(g’)cU. I 
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8. Proof of Proposition 4 
As in Proposition 1, we use the Tychonoff-Kakutani-Ky Fan fixed point 
theorem. We already know .iF x F convex and compact, 
0 # E(g, h) c .V X ,.3@ all (g, h) E .%‘ x X; and E’(e) single valued. Clearly 
E’(e) is continuous. Let (g, h) E .Y x.r. 
Step 1 (E’(g,h) convex). Let h*, h** E Z*(g,h); t9E (0, 1); 
(s, u) E .Y‘ x .U?‘$ = .V’Z; and &.)E 8. h*(a) + (1 - 8) . h**(,). Suppose 
d(s, a; h) = 0. If A c .d, o~e.h*(A,s,~)+(i-e).h**(A,s,~)= 
&I, s, 0) < 1; summing over a E A, C /$a, s, 0) = C [B . h *(a, s, a) + 
(1 -e) . ~**(u,s,u)] = e . c h*( a,s,~) + (1 -e) . zh**(a,s,u) = e. 
h*(As,u) + (l-8) . h * *(A, s, a) = /$A, s, a); and h^(c~J. s, u) = 
8 + 1 - B= 1. Suppose d(s, a; h) # 0. For some y*, y** E r*(g), A*(.) = 
2 y*(.) . h(.; h) and A**(.) = C y**(.) . I$.; h). SO, h(.) = c [e. y*(.) + 
(1 - 0) . y**(.)) . h(.; h). Thus, since T*(g) convex, h^E E*(g, h). 
Step 2 (Z’(g, h) is compact). Let h,* E Z*(g, h) all m E I, h* E X, 
and lim m+a, IlE -h*Il =a Define T(h) 55 {(s, 0) E .i’ x p-2 = 
.Y& 1 d(s, a; h) = O}. Recall E’( g, h) c.37 Suppose (s, a) E :i‘(h). Then 
h* E,p implies h*(., s, a) is a probability measure on .d. Suppose 
(s, u) E ,9-g - .?(h). For each m, there exists y,* E r*(g) with h:(e) = 
c y:(e) e h(.; h). Lemma 5 implies there exist y** ET*(g) and a subse- 
quence y,* of _r,* such that 14 +ocI lly,* - y**ll = 0. Define 
h**(.)=Cy**(.).h(.;h). Then on .9&-.?(h). lim,,,,/Ih**-hzll=O. 
Define &(.,s,u)=h**(.,s,u) all (s,u)E.~‘~ --.7(h) and &(.,~,a)= 
h*(.,s,u) all (s,u)E .‘7(h). Then lim,,, l/h,* -611 = 0. So, G=h*. But 
LE P(g,h). 
Step 3 (Z’(.) is upper semicontinuous on .Tt x F). Let E*(g, h) c 
U = open in E As in the proof of Lemma 4, there exists F > 0 with 
B,(h*) c U each h* E E’( g. h). Let .p(h) be as above. In every case, 
(S,U)E,?Z. 
Lemma 5 shows there exists 6’ > 0 such that g’ E .T and 11 g - g’I/ < 6’ 
imply for each y*’ E T*(g’) we can choose YT ET*(g) with 
IIy* - y*‘(I < e/2. H ence, I/C y*‘(.) . h(.; h) - 2 y*(.) . h(.; h)ll < s/2 all 
(s, u) b? .‘7‘(h). Let h*’ E Z2(g’, h) with h*‘(.) = C v*‘(.) . h(.; h) all 
(s, a) 6Z .7(h). Let h*(a) = C y*(s) . h(.; h) all (s, u) 6? *i”‘(h) and = h*‘(e) 
all (s. a) E :7(h). Then h * E E’( g, h) and )I h * - h *’ /I < e/2. 
For any y* E r(g), let H(e; y*, h) be any element of Z’“‘( g, h) with 
H(a, s, u; y*, h) = C,,,,d y*(a, a’, s, u) . h(a’, s, u; h) all (a, s, a) E .d x 
.?(h)# where .5-‘(h)# = .Y’$ - .;L’(h). Let ($)“* < s/2. Lines (46) and (48) 
show there exists 8” > 0 such that h’ E.X and I( h - h’/I < 6” imply 
.;C *(n*, 2n*) n .F(h)# c .F(h’)# and for all y*” E r*(.? ), a E Ld, and 
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(s, u) E 3(n*, 2n”) n .T(h)#, /Co’E,dy*“(a, a’, s, 0) . h(a’, s, a; h’) - 
CalEd ~*“(a, a’, s, a) . h(u’, s, cr; h)l < s/2. For all such h’, given any 
H(.; )I*“, h’) we can find H(e; y*“, h) equal to H(.; I,*“, h’) all (a, s, a) E 
.d x (:Y’*(n*, 2n*) f~ (.‘7’(h’)# - .?‘(A)#)). Thus, if Y*” E r*(.‘?‘), h’ E.p, 
and Ilh -h’II < 8”, for each H(.;y*“,h’) we can find H(.; ~*“,h) with 
IIH(.; )I*“, h’ ) - H(* ; y*“, h)ll < F/2. 
Let 6 > 0 and 6 < 6’, 6”. Let (g’, h’)E.+ X K IIg--‘I/ <& 
llh - A’]( < 6, and y *’ E T*(g’). Choose any H(e; y*‘, h’). Then there exists 
H(.; Y*‘, h) with IIH(.; y*‘, h’) - H(.; y*‘. h)ll < c/2, and there are 
y* E r*(g) and H(.; ‘J*, h) with llH(.; y*‘, h) - H(e; y*. h)ll < s/2. So, 
IIH(.; y*‘, h’) - H(.; y*, h)ll < 8. Every element of E*(g’, h’) has the 
form H(.;y *‘, h’) some y*’ E T*(g’). Thus, E’( g’, h’) c UIIEI1,e,hj 
B,(H)c U. 1 
9. Proof of Lemma 6 
We deal with Z *(@. V*(e) is virtually the same. Let “lim” stand for 
“lim,._,“. 
Suppose g,. E .a *(Q all m* E I. Lemma 3 shows there exists g E ‘5 and 
subsequence g, of g,. with lim 11 g, - g/l = 0. 
Step 1. We show g E .Z *(Q. 
Let s, ,..., s, E .i and u. u’ E ‘9 2. Then 1 g(s, ,..., s,, u) - g(s, ,..., s,, a’)1 < 
I g(s, *.... s,, , 0) - g,(s, ‘...? s, 5 o)l + I g,(s, ....3 s, 3 0) - g,(s, ,..., S,? a’>1 t 
/Is’“- 
. . . . s,, 0’) - g(sl ,..., snr a’)/. Letting m + co and noting g, E .‘G “(B), 
s, ,.... s, 1 0) - g(s, r***, s,,, a’)1 < 8”. Since s, ,..., s,, E .9 and u, u’ E .Y’,” 
are arbitrary, g E .Z *(Q. 
Step 2. We show lim *II g, - gl/* = 0. 
Fix any E > 0. Choose n with 8” < e/4. Choose M = M(n, E) such that 
m > M implies I g(s, ,..., snr a,*) - g,(s, ,..., s,, at)/ < s/2 all s, ,..., s, E .9 . 
Then m > M implies that for any s ,,..., s, E .i and any uE.‘iz, 
I g(s, ,.... Snr 0) - g,(s, ,***. s,, a)1 Q I g(s, ,.*.. s,, 0) - g(s, 1...1 s,, a,*,1 + 
/ g(s, 3.W.Y s,. aIf) - g,(s, ,.... s, 3 @>I + 1 g,(s, ,..., s, 3 a,*) + g,(s, ,...’ s,, a)1 < 
8” t (s/2) + en < E. SO, lim *II g, - g/l* = 0. I 
10. Proof of Proposition 5 
Let line (55) hold. Let “lim” stand for “lim,,,“. The proof of 
Proposition 3 shows there exists (g, h) E K and a subsequence (g,, h,) of 
(g,, h,) such that lim I/ g, - gll = 0 = lim /I h, - h 11. Taking a subsequence 
of (g,, h,) if necessary, Lemma 6 shows there exists 
(g*,h*)E.Z *(B)x~F*(@ with lim*/Ig,-g*I/*=O=lim*Ilh,--h*l(*. 
g*Il=O=limIlh,-h*Il.Thus,g=g*on.Yz 
.d x ,‘i * so, lim* /lg,- g*Ij* = 
- h*ll*oi--‘lim* l/h, -h/j*. I 
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